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This paper examines whether or not a prolonged unemployment period can raise the quality of job 
matching after unemployment.  We focus on job tenure as an indicator of a good quality job match 
after unemployment.  We match two sets of Japanese administrative data compiled by the public 
employment security offices: one includes information about the circumstances of job seekers 
receiving unemployment insurance, and the other includes information about job seekers applying for 
jobs.  We first show a negative relationship between unemployment duration and the subsequent job 
duration.  Restricting the sample to job seekers who lower their reservation wage in the final 59 days 
before expiration of unemployment insurance, we secondly show an even greater negative effect of 
unemployment duration on the following job duration.  The importance lies not only in the duration 
of unemployment.  If job seekers keep a high reservation wage because of the benefits of 
unemployment insurance, and lower it in response to the expiration of insurance, prolonged 
unemployment will result in short job duration after unemployment. 
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Unemployment insurance is often analyzed in terms of its effect on job search behavior 
during unemployment.  Search theory suggests that unemployment insurance can raise the 
reservation wage of job seekers, lower search efforts, lower the rates of exit out of 
unemployment, and thus lengthen the unemployment period.  Many empirical studies 
support this discouraging effect of unemployment insurance on job searches.  The jump 
up in employment around the expiration of unemployment insurance and thus prolonged 
unemployment duration until the expiration date is reported by many researchers, for 
example, Moffitt (1985), Katz and Meyer (1990), Poterba and Summers (1995), Green and 
Riddell (1997), Card and Levine (2000) for the U.S. results, and Carling, Holmlund and 
Vejsiu (2001), Bover, Arellano and Bentolila (2002), Lalive and Zweimüller (2004), Lalive, 
Van Ours and Zweimüller (2006), Lalive (2007), and Card, Chetty and Weber (2007) for 
the European results.   
A prolonged period of unemployment, however, does not always produce an undesirable 
result.  Longer periods of unemployment may lead to a better job match.  A limited 
number of studies have been conducted on this topic, as opposed to the abundant literature 
on the effect that benefits of unemployment insurance lengthen unemployment duration.  
The present paper examines the effect of long unemployment duration on job match quality 
using Japanese microdata that contains information from before, during and after the 
unemployment period. 
Among the limited amount of research on job match quality, several papers examine the 
relationship between unemployment duration and wage after unemployment.  Addison, 
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McKinley and Blackburn (2000), Gaure, Roed and Westlie (2008), and Ohkusa (2004) 
suggest there is a higher wage after longer unemployment.  In contrast, Classen (1977), 
Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006), and Card, Chetty and Weber (2007) suggest there is a 
lower wage after longer unemployment.  The empirical results on the effect that longer 
unemployment has on job match quality in terms of wage are inconsistent.  
We focus on another side of job match quality: job stability after unemployment.  
Focusing on job duration as a measure of job match quality is important in several senses.  
First, a low wage at the point when the job began, which is used as a measure of job quality 
in most empirical investigations of job matching, may not always indicate a bad match.  
Rather than the wage level at the beginning of employment, a wage increase after that may 
be an important indicator of job match quality, although wage history is seldom traced over 
time.  Secondly, workers may not place a high value on their wage.  They consider many 
aspects in assessing job quality, including work environment, work satisfaction, 
convenience in daily life and so on.  Job stability, in contrast, measures how agreeable 
matching is between workers and employers, and reflects all of these aspects.  Thirdly, 
despite its importance, job stability after unemployment has not been sufficiently examined 
empirically.   
We will use two sets of administrative data compiled separately by Japanese public 
employment security offices.  One set is used for the administration of unemployment 
insurance, that is, to record the circumstances of job seekers receiving unemployment 
insurance.  The other set is used for the administration of finding employment, in other 
words, to store information about job seekers applying for jobs.  We need information 
from both data sets to examine the relationship between job searching and job matching, so 
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we combine the two data sets using an identification number related to unemployment 
insurance.  
The use of these data has several advantages.  First of all, our data follow up job losers’ 
behaviors before, during, and after unemployment.  This makes it possible to examine the 
effect of unemployment duration on subsequent job duration, and control for many 
individual characteristics before and after unemployment.   
Second, our data contains information related to the intensity of job searching (based on 
job application).  Although the data do not directly examine reservation wage, we can 
predict changes in reservation wage by a change in the intensity of job searching.  Thus, 
we can control for changes in reservation wage, which is not sufficiently done in most 
existing empirical literature in spite of its importance in a theoretical sense.  
Third, these data are compiled by public employment security offices for administrative 
purposes.  This makes it possible to avoid the problem of sample selection, because 
respondents are restricted to recipients of unemployment insurance but are not self-selected, 
unlike in general survey data.  Fourth, the data represent all the unemployed who lost their 
jobs during the same month in the same year throughout the country.  This makes it 
possible to control for conditions in the macro economy when they became unemployed.  
Fifth, there has been little research examining the relationship between job search and the 
quality of job matching in Japan, while the prolonged recession and a dramatic increase in 
unemployment in Japan have garnered attention in many countries.   
Our empirical investigations first show that longer unemployment duration decreases job 
duration after unemployment.  We further show that this negative effect becomes greater 
if we examine the cases where job seekers lowered their reservation wages and changed 
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their intensity of job searching (based on job application) in the final 59 days before 
expiration of unemployment insurance.  That is, longer unemployment duration does 
lower job stability more seriously, if a job seeker once set a high reservation wage and gave 
it up later when benefits of unemployment insurance came to lapse.  If we consider that 
job duration is one of the indicators of a high quality job match, longer unemployment 
duration owing to a high reservation wage does not lead to a better job match. 
This paper is composed of four main sections.  Theoretical background, the empirical 
model and related existing literature are given in the next section.  The administrative data 
used in our estimations are introduced in Section III.  The empirical results and their 
implications are reported in Section IV.  Concluding remarks are given in the final section. 
II. Theoretical Framework and the Empirical Model 
A simple sequential search model incorporating tenure of a job after unemployment 
shows that longer unemployment duration leads to a higher separation rate and shorter 
tenure at a job after unemployment (Appendix shows the details).  Suppose that workers 
are either employed or unemployed at any one point in time.  All of the unemployed first 
receive the benefits of unemployment insurance (UI, hereafter).  The UI benefits expire 
and the receivers become unqualified for UI at a Poisson rate .  That is, the reservation 
wage differs depending on the duration of unemployment.  A recipient of UI benefits 
accepts a job offer if the offered wage exceeds the reservation wage wR୦ (Type h worker), 
while an individual who is no longer qualified for UI benefits accepts the offer if the 
offered wage exceeds the reservation wage wR୪ (Type l worker).  We assume that 
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wR୦ ൐ wR୪ .   
  Once workers start working after unemployment, an exogenous separation shock occurs 
for both types of workers.  The Type h worker, who has found a job before the expiration 
of UI benefits, does not stop working even if he or she faces an exogenous separation shock, 
and continue working until an exogenous death shock arrives.  This is because the Type h 
worker started working when his or her reservation wage exceeded the value of 
unemployment.  In other words, the Type h worker would have a higher job matching 
quality, because he or she was more selective during unemployment: a higher wage was 
required to accept an offer.   
   The Type l worker, who has found a job after UI benefits began to expire, separates 
from the post-unemployment job and becomes unemployed again once eligible for UI 
benefits if his or her wage is under a certain wage level, wT..  This is the turnover wage for 
the Type l worker, which is affected both by the reservation wage before and after 
expiration of UI benefits (wR୦ and wR୪ , respectively).  As explained in Appendix, the Type 
l worker is likely to separate from the post-unemployment job and search for a better job, as 
wR୦ increases.  As wR୪   decreases, the unemployed person is less selective in a job search 
because he or she prefers to be patient with a lower wage for a while, waiting for another 
chance to be unemployed once eligible for UI benefits (the entitlement effect).  Generous 
UI benefits raising wR୦ and lowering wR୪  , result in a decrease in the job match quality, and 
encourage the Type l worker to shorten his or her subsequent job tenure.  Moreover, 
compared to the Type h workers who started working before UI expiration and thus had a 
shorter unemployment duration, the Type l workers who started working after UI expiration 
with longer unemployment duration would have shorter job tenure at the 
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post-unemployment job.   
   There are a limited number of empirical studies which examine whether or not longer 
unemployment duration leads to lower quality job matching.  It is hard to obtain 
information on workers' search behavior during unemployment, as well as their work 
behavior after unemployment.   
   Among available studies, Centeno (2004) shows that generous UI benefits lead to 
longer subsequent job tenure, using data from US job seekers mainly in the 1980s and 
1990s.  Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) find that longer unemployment duration has no 
effect on the probability of finding a permanent job in Slovenia.  Card, Chetty and Weber 
(2007) also find no relationship between long unemployment duration and subsequent job 
duration in Austria.  In contrast, Belzil (2001) shows that in Canada longer unemployment 
duration reduces post-unemployment job duration because of a lower reservation wage 
during the search period.  Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) and Paserman (2007) show 
that impatient job seekers decrease their reservation wage a lot once the UI benefits came to 
expire, which raises the exit rates around the expiration date, and that the subsequent job 
match quality, which is measured by wage in the studies above, thus would become lower.   
   Following the existing empirical studies, we will conduct reduced form estimates of the 
effect of unemployment duration on separation rates in subsequent jobs.  We will analyze 
parametrically the hazard of job separation.  We assume a non-constant hazard over time 
to allow duration dependence created by heterogeneity.  By the empirical test shown in the 
Results section, we assume a log-normal distribution for the hazard rates:  
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where Φ  denotes a normal distribution and   is positive.  The explanatory variables, xi, 
include individual characteristics and the variables related to job arrival rates and search 
efforts.  The details are explained in Section IV.  We maximize the likelihood of 
lnܮሺβሻ ൌ ∑ d୧ln݂ሺt୧|x୧୬୧ୀଵ ; βሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ d୧ሻln ሾሺ1 െ ܨሺt୧|x୧; βሻ , where F and f are the 
cumulative density and its density of job duration , using BHHH algorithms1.   
   The important aspect in our analysis is to capture the change in reservation wages and 
search behaviors.  Unfortunately, our data do not directly ask the change in reservation 
wages during unemployment periods 2 .  Instead, we can observe the dates of job 
applications.  Using job application dates in conjunction with UI expiration dates, we 
identify "late appliers" who started applying for a job later during the duration of UI 
benefits.   
   Note that this identification depends not only on the unemployment periods, but also on 
the periods remaining until the expiration of UI benefits.  The length of unemployment 
duration may reflect differences in individuals' heterogeneities other than changes in 
reservation wages.  For example, an individual with low ability may have longer 
                                                  
1 We can allow unobserved heterogeneity by setting the hazard function as λሺt୧|x୧ሻu୧ instead of 
λሺt୧|x୧ሻ, adding the unobservable multiplicative error term iu , and assuming a gamma distribution 
for iu  with expectation of 1 and variance of  .  We conducted the estimate under this setting of 
unobservable heterogeneity, and confirmed that the variance component   is near zero and 
statistically insignificant, and that the estimates shown later in Section IV have been hardly changed.   
2 Krueger and Mueller (2008) directly measure search intensity by the number of hours devoted to 
job search per day, and find that it falls as unemployment benefits become more generous, and rises 
prior to benefit expiration.  Unfortunately, our data do not contain any information on specific time 
devoted to job searching. 
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unemployment duration and shorter job tenure, and thus we may find a negative 
relationship between the two lengths.  Likewise, those who have high value of working, 
and/or those who have strong incentive to work may also show a negative relationship 
between the two lengths.  In those cases, it is an individual's heterogeneity, and not a 
longer unemployment duration caused by exogenous reasons such as UI benefits, that raises 
the separation rate at a post-unemployment job.  The length of time until UI expiration, on 
the other hand, can explain the effect of the change in reservation wages more directly, 
because this length of time is linked to the institutional decisions on UI.  We compare the 
results for the entire sample to those restricted to the late appliers, considering that the latter 
set and kept high reservation wages in the beginning of the search period and lowered them 
at the end of the search period in response to the expiration of UI.  
The effect of unemployment duration on post-unemployment job duration may be 
different between young and senior job seekers.  In order to investigate this age difference, 
we separate the whole sample into two groups.  One group is composed of job seekers 
between 16 and 44, and the other group is composed of job seekers between 45 and 64.   
 
III. The Data  
III-1. Two Administrative Data Sets 
We use two administrative data sets compiled by the Japanese public employment 
security offices.  One is an administrative data set on unemployment insurance (Koyo 
Hoken Gyomu Tokei), and the other is an administrative data set on job findings (Shokugyo 
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Antei Gyomu Tokei).  Although these are compiled separately for different administrative 
purposes, we merged them using the UI identification number.  
The sample is composed of the unemployed who lost their jobs in August 2005.  They 
were all eligible for UI, and appeared in person in public employment security offices to 
apply for UI.  Among them, we use the sample that started working after the 
unemployment period, because our focus is job duration after unemployment.  Thus, our 
sample is composed of individuals who lost their jobs in August 2005, spent at least one 
day unemployed, qualified for UI, and worked for at least one day upon finding a job.  
We remove those who are over 65 years old, seasonal workers (Tanki Tokurei Hi- 
Hokensha), and day workers (Hiyatoi Rodosha) because their job seeking behaviors and/or 
the job market conditions for them may be different from the other individuals in the 
sample.  Most part-time workers (those who work fewer than 20 hours per week), the 
self-employed, and civil servants are also removed, because they are not usually covered by 
the UI system.  The workers in fixed-term employment after unemployment are also 
removed because some of them choose short-term employment as an appropriate job for 
them. 
The timing of the survey is summarized in Figure 1.  One of the most important 
variables in this paper is unemployment duration, which is shown as a black dotted line in 
the figure.  This is defined as the period from the day of stopping the previous job until the 
day prior to starting the subsequent job.  During unemployment, job seekers go to a public 
employment security office to find a job.  At the office, they can search for openings 
mainly on computers and/or in written documents.  If a job seeker finds a suitable job, he 
or she goes to a counter to get direct counsel from a counselor.  A counselor provides 
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detailed information on the job, and provides advice as to whether or not to apply for the 
job.  If the job seeker decides to apply for the job, the counselor introduces him or her to 
the employer as an applicant.  The job seeker, who is now a job applicant, has an 
interview, and the employer decides to hire him or her.  The job applicant has to inform 
the public employment security office of receiving an acceptance, and starts working 
shortly after receiving a formal notice of being hired.  A rejected job seeker will continue 
to search for a job3.  
Another important variable in our study is job tenure after unemployment, which is 
shown as a thick black line in Figure 1.  If the worker had already ceased working at the 
final survey point (July 2005), his or her job tenure is not truncated but completed, and 
equal to the period from the first day of starting a job until the last working day.  
Individual 1 in the figure is an example of this.  If the worker continued working at the 
survey point, his or her temporally-measured tenure, which is the period from the first day 
of starting a job until the survey point, is truncated.  Individuals 2 and 3 are examples of 
this.  We analyze a hazard rate of getting out of a job at one time point, t conditional on 
surviving until t-14.  
                                                  
3 In Japan, job seekers qualified for UI benefits need to come to a public employment security 
office to seek for job vacancies when they receive UI benefits.  However, the unemployed can find 
job vacancies through other sources such as newspapers and the internet, and make appointments 
directly with the employer.  Our sample does not include them.  We cannot conclude that this 
overestimates or underestimates the negative effect of unemployment duration on 
post-unemployment job duration.  Job seekers who can receive UI may have high potential for 
work: Japanese workers are not qualified unless they have worked for at least six months.  On the 
other hand, job seekers who come to the employment security office to consult with the officers 
have low employment potential or low productivity. 
4 If a length of a temporally-measured job duration is regressed on a length of unemployment 
11 
 
As for the explanatory variables, we control for worker characteristics such as age, a 
dummy variable indicating gender, a dummy variable indicating a married worker, and 
years of education.  For the information on a job before unemployment, we control for the 
job tenure of the previous job, a dummy variable indicating whether or not the worker quit 
a job involuntarily, monthly wage when the worker stopped the previous job, and the 
monthly wage difference before and after unemployment.  To control for market labor 
conditions, we include effective job rates in the local labor market when the worker started 
a job after unemployment5.  
After conducting the estimate in the entire sample, we restrict them to late appliers who 
may have lowered the reservation wage later during a job search.  Our data shows when 
job seekers apply for job openings, and when benefits of UI expire.  We identify those 
who do not apply for a job opening 59 days prior to the UI expiration date as late appliers.  
They have kept a high reservation wage while receiving UI benefits, and lowered it later in 
response to the expiration of UI benefits.   
The reason for focusing on 59 days is that it can be a threshold to judge the change in 
reservation wages, since first-applications for a job opening rise between 60 and 89 days 
                                                                                                                                                  
duration, the negative correlation between the two durations can be found by definition, because 
longer unemployment duration means starting a job at a later point in time, and shorter 
temporally-measured job duration after unemployment.  In our sample, about twenty four percent 
are a completed sample who once started working and went back to an unemployment pool one year 
later at the final survey point. 
5 As for post-unemployment wage, it is assumed to be exogenous for simplification.  As for the 
possibility of getting job training, it is not included in explanatory variables, but rather assumed to 
be controlled for by the other explanatory variables.  This is the same assumption made in many 
other recent empirical studies.  Our job duration after unemployment is a maximum of one year, so 
that the effect of accumulation of human capital may be small. 
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before the UI expiration date: about 19.4% of job seekers in our estimated sample applied 
for a job opening for the first time more than 90 days before the expiration date, 24.6% did 
between 60 and 89 days before the expiration date, 15.8% did between 30 and 59 days 
before the expiration date, 16.7% did between 0 and 29 days before or after the expiration 
date, and 21.1% did 30 days after the expiration date.  Thus, the job seekers that we 
defined as lowering reservation wages in the later stages of UI benefits are 56% of the 
whole sample6. 
Figure 1 shows the example of timings of applying for job openings for the first time 
during unemployment (upward arrow), and the timing of expiration of UI benefits (triangle).  
In this example, Individual 3 is a late applier.  Note that our focus is not just on the timing 
of the first application (the place of the upward arrow during unemployment), but also the 
distance of the first application from the end of UI benefits (how far the upward arrow is 
located from the triangle).  Individuals 2 and 3 have identical lengths of unemployment 
and subsequent truncated job tenure, while they are very different in the sense that 
Individual 3 changed reservation wage in response to the expiration of UI benefits.  In 
order to find the effects of a change in reservation wage, we examine whether the 
relationship between the length of unemployment and length of subsequent job tenure 
would remain unchanged even after restricting the sample to late appliers.   
 
III-2. Unemployment and Job Duration in Our Sample 
                                                  
6 The other thresholds such as 29 days before the UI expiration date, and anytime after the UI 
expiration date, can also be examined.  The problem of focusing on these thresholds is that the 
estimate sample, and thus the test power, is decreased.     
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Panel A of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in our estimate for 
the whole sample.  The average age at unemployment is 36 years old, about 51% are male, 
and 42% are married.  The average tenure before unemployment is 1586 days (about 52.9 
months), and the average monthly wage before unemployment is about 201 thousand yen.  
These numbers are smaller than the averages in all of Japan (the average tenure is 13.4 
years, and the average monthly wage is 372 thousand yen in 2005, according to the Basic 
Survey on Wage Structure compiled by the Statistics Bureau of Japan), which is not 
surprising since our data includes more young, female workers.   
   The average unemployment duration, which is also the search period, is about 128 days 
(4 months).  More specifically, the job seekers who found jobs during the first 29 days of 
their job search make up 10.8%, those between 31 and 60 days are 17.6%, those between 
61 and 90 days are 14.2%, those between 91 and 150 days are 17.7%, those between 150 
and 210 days are 16.6%, those between 180 and 210 days are 8.2%, and those more than 
210 days are 23.2%.  During unemployment, all the job seekers in our sample were able to 
get UI benefits.  The potential periods of UI benefit depend on age and tenure in the 
previous job.  About 76.7% receive 90 days, 8.5% receive 120 days, 3.7% receive 150 
days, 4.2% receive 180 days, and the remaining 7.0% receive either 210, 240, 270, or 360 
days.  About 48% get out of unemployment with at least one day of UI benefits 
remaining.   
   The separation rates 6 and 12 months after starting work at a post-unemployment job 
are 22.4% and 27.3%, respectively7.  Figure 2 shows the empirical survivor function, 
                                                  
7 The last survey point is July 13, 2006, which is about one year after the starting date of 
unemployment (August, 2005).  Thus, the maximum (temporary) tenure after unemployment is 
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S෠ሺtሻ ൌ Πୱழ௧ሺ1 െ λሺsሻሻ, where )(s  is the hazard function.  The figures are shown 
separately by categories of the number of days of unemployment.  The longer the 
unemployment duration, the more workers separate from jobs after unemployment.  The 
two time periods may not be linearly correlated, so we use logarithms of unemployment 
duration in our estimation.   
   As mentioned, we focus on the sample who had not applied for job openings until 59 
days before UI expiration.  Panel B of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for them.  
They are often young, female, and unmarried compared to the entire sample.  Their 
previous job tenure before unemployment is shorter, and most of them quit the job 
voluntarily (only 2% stop previous jobs involuntarily), suggesting that they are quitting jobs 
repeatedly.  Their monthly wage in the previous job before unemployment is also lower.  
Their unemployment duration is longer, and their job duration after unemployment is 
shorter compared to the entire sample.  Figure 3 shows job separation rates by job search 
intensity.  Those who started applying for job openings at least 60 days before the 
expiration date of UI seem to stay longer at their subsequent jobs.   
IV. Results  
Before examining the relationship between unemployment duration and subsequent job 
duration, we determine the specification of a hazard function for job separation.  Several 
statistics such as Akaike's information criterion and plots of residuals suggest a log-normal 
distribution for the hazard function.  The job separation rate in our data increases 
                                                                                                                                                  
343 days.  Since about 70% are truncated, the average job tenure after unemployment is 163.52 days, 
or 5.45 months, assuming the maximum tenure for the truncated samples is 343 days.   
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progressively, and once the rate reaches its highest value, it starts declining gradually.  
Table 2 shows the results using the entire sample.  The coefficient of unemployment 
duration has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level.  The longer unemployment 
duration becomes, the shorter job duration is after unemployment.  That is, assuming that 
long job duration reflects a high quality job match, a long period of unemployment lowers 
the quality of the job match.  
We obtain similar results for both the group of younger workers aged from 16 to 44 and 
the group of older workers aged from 45 to 64.  The estimates are larger for the latter 
group, which means that the negative effect unemployment duration has on subsequent job 
tenure is stronger for older workers.  
As for the other explanatory variables, the time at a job after unemployment becomes 
shorter as the workers grow older when they are below the age of 44, and longer as the 
workers grow older when they are above the age of 45.  Note that the individuals in our 
sample are those who experienced unemployment at least once.  The results may suggest 
that the younger workers who came back to work from unemployment may quit their job 
sooner than before—job duration for the younger workers becomes shorter when they quit 
jobs repeatedly.  This tendency is not found in older workers, who know that they face 
lower demand for their labor once they stop working.  
Married workers and male workers over 45 years old stay longer at post-unemployment 
jobs, because they may have dependents.  The more educated people may have higher job 
match quality because of higher productivity, although this effect is not found in the 
workers over 45 years old.  Job matching for senior workers may be influenced by other 
factors such as job experience rather than education level.  Those who worked for a long 
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period in their previous job work for a longer period again in the subsequent job.  Those 
who ceased the previous job involuntarily have shorter job duration after unemployment.  
In other words, job quitters have high job separation rates.  The significantly positive sign 
of the coefficient of effective job rates suggests that good labor market conditions lead to 
higher quality job matching.  Finally, the wage of the current job makes younger workers 
stay in the job, although wage incentives may not exist for older workers.  
How is the change in reservation wages related to the quality of job matching?  In order 
to examine this, we restrict the sample to the late appliers.  Table 3 shows the results 
obtained for those who had not started job seeking until 59 days before UI expiration during 
their unemployment periods.  The coefficients of unemployment duration are negative and 
significant at the 1% significance level for both the younger and older samples.  The 
magnitude of the estimates is much larger than in the case of the entire sample unrestricted 
to late appliers, which is shown in Table 2.  That is, job seekers who have started applying 
for job openings in less than 59 days before UI expiration separate from their subsequent 
jobs earlier than the others.  This is found not only in younger workers, but also in senior 
workers.  The prolonged duration of unemployment harms post-unemployment job 
stability more seriously if the job seekers have lowered their reservation wage because of 
UI expiration.   
It might be thought that a larger negative relationship between the length of 
unemployment duration and the length of subsequent job duration for late appliers has 
arisen not by setting reservation wages higher but for other reasons.  For example, a late 
applier may have low value of working, and thus she has longer unemployment and shorter 
job duration.  However, such an individual characteristic unrelated to UI settings cannot 
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explain our results, since our late appliers are those who changed search behaviors in 
response to UI expiration.  As another point, it may be thought that a late applier can 
always get a better job: the longer the unemployed wait, the better offer they gain.  
However, a possibility of getting a better job does not have any relation to UI expiration.   
In summary, there is a negative relationship between unemployment duration and job 
duration after unemployment in Japan.  Moreover, longer unemployment duration does 
hurt job stability more seriously if a job seeker kept reservation wages at a high level based 
on the amount of UI benefits.  The important implication of our results is not that a 
negative relationship between unemployment and post-unemployment job duration exists, 
but that the situation would be worse if job seekers kept a high reservation wage with the 
UI benefits.  Prolonged unemployment duration will result in shorter job duration after 
unemployment if job seekers lower their reservation wage in response to the imminent 
expiration of UI benefits.   
 
V. Conclusion  
This paper examined whether or not a prolonged unemployment period can raise the 
quality of job matching after unemployment.  We focused on job tenure as an indicator of 
a good job match after unemployment.  We matched two Japanese administrative data sets 
compiled by public employment security offices using an identification number related to 
unemployment insurance.   
Our empirical investigation first showed a negative relationship between unemployment 
duration and the subsequent job duration.  The paper then showed this negative effect 
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could be greater for the job seekers who put a high reservation wage in the beginning of job 
search and lowered it later in the final 59 days before the expiration of UI.  The 
importance lies not only in the duration of unemployment.  Prolonged unemployment 
duration will not be rewarded with longer job duration after unemployment, especially 
when job seekers lower their reservation wages later in response to the expiration of UI.  If 
we consider that job duration is one of the indicators of a good quality job match, longer 
unemployment duration with lower reservation wage does not lead to a better job match. 
   There had been little research that examined the matching quality and controlled for the 
change in reservation wage during unemployment.  In addition, there had been little 
research that investigated job match quality focusing on post-unemployment job stability.  
The number of empirical examinations for Japanese cases had been especially limited.  
Our results, which are based on the extensive micro data compiled by the Japanese 
government, and which utilize information regarding the timing of applications for jobs as 
well as the timing of expiration of unemployment insurance benefits, may prove as valuable 
evidence concerning the negative effect that long unemployment with a lowered reservation 
wage has on subsequent job stability.  The UI benefits could make the unemployed keep 
their reservation wage higher, and thus lead to longer unemployment and shorter 






Appendix. Derivation of wage schemes and comparative statics concerning the 
effect of UI benefits on unemployment duration and job tenure after unemployment 
The value functions of employment (W୦ሺwሻ) and unemployment (U୦) for the Type h 
worker who is qualified for UI benefits are given by:                             
rW୦ሺwሻ ൌ w െ σW୦ሺwሻ,                                (1) 
rU୦ ൌ z ൅ α׬ ሾW୦ሺwሻ െ U୦ሿdFሺwሻ ൅ δሺU୪െU୦୵ഥ୵R౞ ሻ െ σU୦,     (2) 
where r is discount rate, z is unemployment benefits,  is death rate, and  is job arrival rate.  
An offered wage is randomly drawn from the wage distribution Fሺwሻ.  The Type h 
worker, who has found a job before the expiration of UI benefits, does not stop working 
voluntarily since he or she started working when the offered wage exceeded the reservation 
wage (wR୦). 
 
   For the Type l worker who is no longer qualified for UI benefits, the value function of 
being employed (W୪ሺwሻ) is: 
        rW୪ሺwሻ ൌ w ൅ λሾmaxሺW୪ሺwሻ, U୦ሻ െW୪ሺwሻሿ െ σW୪ሺwሻ,   (3) 
where  represents an exogenous separation shock.  After an arrival of a separation shock, 
the type l employed chooses either to remain employed or to quit and become unemployed 
with eligibility of the provision of unemployment benefits.  If eq.(3) is evaluated at the 
reservation wage for the type l worker (wR୪ ), it is rewritten as: 
rW୪൫wR୪ ൯ ൌ wR୪ ൅ λൣU୦ െW୪൫wR୪ ൯൧ െ σW୪൫wR୪ ൯.       (4) 
The max operator implies that the value of unemployment with eligibility of the provision 
of UI benefits is higher than the value for the type l worker of being employed with the 
reservation wage: max൫W୪൫wR୪ ൯, U୦൯ ൌ U୦. It will be checked later.  Equations (1)-(4) 
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and the reservation wage properties give: 
      U୪ ൌ ሺ୰ାσሻ୵Rౢା୵R
౞
ሺ୰ାσሻሺ୰ାσାሻ                                         (5) 
            wR୦ ൌ ቀ ୰ାσା୰ାσାାδቁ ቂz ൅ ቀ
α




୰ାσାାδ.     (6) 
   When a separation shock arrives, the type l worker, who has found a job after the 
expiration of UI benefits, voluntarily separates from the post-unemployment job and 
becomes unemployed again with the eligibility of UI benefits if the current wage is under a 
certain wage level, WT.  This is referred to as the turnover wage at which the Type l 
worker is indifferent between the states of unemployment and employment: W୪ሺwTሻ ൌU୦.  
These conditions with eqs.(1) and (3) and reservation wage properties give: 
            wT ൌ wR୦                                        (7) 
Thus, we can summarize the two cases where the Type l worker faces as: 
(i) When wR୪ ൑ w ൏ ݓ்൫ൌ wR୦൯ is offered, the capital gain of being employed is given 
by: 
W୪ሺwሻ െ U୪ ൌ w െ wR
୪
r ൅ σ ൅ . 
This is derived by eq.(3) with maxሺW୪ሺwሻ, U୦ሻ ൌ U୦, and eq.(4).  The Type l worker 
separates the current job and becomes unemployed when a separation shock arrives. 
(ii) When w ൒ wTሺൌ wR୦ሻ is offered, the capital gain of being employed is obtained: 
W୪തതതതሺwሻ െ U୪ ൌ w െ wR
୪
r ൅ σ ൅ ൅
ሺw െ wR୦ሻ
ሺr ൅ σሻሺr ൅ σ ൅ ሻ. 
This is derived by eq.(3) with maxሺW୪ሺwሻ, U୦ሻ ൌ W୪ሺwሻ, and eq.(5).  Type l worker 
remains employed in the current firm even though a separation shock arrives. 
   We can rewrite the value function of employment for the Type l workers as 
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rU୪ ൌ αන ሾW୪
୵R౞
୵Rౢ
ሺwሻ െ U୪ሿdFሺwሻ ൅ αන ሾ
୵ഥ
୵R౞
W୪തതതതሺwሻ െ U୪ሿdFሺwሻ െ σU୪. 
This with the two wage conditions shown in cases (i) and (ii) gives: 
ሺr ൅ σሻwR୪ ൅ wR୦ ൌ α׬ ሺw െ୵ഥ୵Rౢ wR
୪ ሻdFሺwሻ ൅ ஑୰ା஢ ׬ ሺw െ
୵ഥ
୵R౞ wR
୦ሻdFሺwሻ.    (8) 
Solving the equations (6) and (8), we get 
wR୦ ൌ ൬ r ൅ σr ൅ σ ൅ δ൰ ቊz ൅ ቈ
α
r ൅ σ ൅ ൅
αሺr ൅ σ ൅ δሻ




൅ ൬ δr ൅ σ ൅ δ൰ ቀ
α





wR୪ ൌ ൬ r ൅ σ ൅ ൰ ቈെ
r ൅ σ ൅ 
r ൅ σ ൅ δ z ൅
αδ




൅ ൬ r ൅ σr ൅ σ ൅ ൰ ൤
αሺr ൅ σ ൅ δ ൅ ሻ




A comparison of these wage equations implies wR୦ ൐ wR୪ .  In addition, we obtain: 
W୪൫wR୪ ൯ ൌ
ሺr ൅ σሻwR୪ ൅ wR୦
ሺr ൅ σሻሺr ൅ σ ൅ ሻ ൏
wR୦
r ൅ σ ൌ U୦, 
which ensures that, as raised in eq(3), max൫W୪൫wR୪ ൯, U୦൯ ൌ U୦. 




























Aଵଵ ൌ 1 ൅ ൬ r ൅ σ ൅ r ൅ σ ൅ δ ൅ ൰ ቀ
α
r ൅ σቁ ൣ1 െ F൫wR
୦൯൧ ൐ 0, 
Aଵଶ ൌ െ δr ൅ σ ൅ δ ൅  ൏ 0, 
Aଶଵ ൌ ൅ ൬ αr ൅ σ൰ ൣ1 െ F൫wR
୦൯൧ ൐ 0, 
Aଶଶ ൌ ሺr ൅ σሻ ൅ αൣ1 െ F൫wR୪ ൯൧ ൐ 0, 
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Bଵଵ ൌ r ൅ σ ൅ r ൅ σ ൅ δ ൅  ൐ 0, 
Bଵଶ ൌ െ r ൅ σ ൅ ሺr ൅ σ ൅ δ ൅ ሻଶ ቈz ൅ ቀ
α
r ൅ σቁන ሺw െ
୵ഥ
୵R౞
wR୦ሻdFሺwሻ െ wR୪ ቉ ൏ 0. 
The last inequality holds since z ൅ ቀ ஑୰ା஢ቁ ׬ ሺw െ
୵ഥ
୵R౞ wR
୦ሻdFሺwሻ  shows the reservation 
wage for UI-qualified unemployed people, which is wR୦ at =0.  This should be higher 
than wR୪ .  In addition,  
Bଶଵ ൌ 0, 
Bଶଶ ൌ 0. 
 








dδ ൐ 0. 
Generous UI benefits either in terms of the amount of benefits (higher z) or in terms of the 
length of eligibility (lower ) has a positive effect on wRh but a negative effect on wRl.   
   Finally, the average tenure at the post-unemployment job is 
tenureሺhሻ ൌ 1σ 





൨ ቀଵ஢ቁ.            (9) 
respectively for the Type h worker, and for the Type l worker.  In sum, generous UI 
benefits, changing both reservation wages of wR୦ሺൌ wTሻ and wR୪ , lead to a shorter tenure 
for the workers who found a job after UI expiration.  Those who had a longer 
unemployment period until UI expiration face a higher retention rate and thus shorter tenure 
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Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
job tenures after unemployment 163.5199 89.1002 1 343 132.6334 76.9224 1 311
unemployment durations (days) 127.8522 85.66801 1 344 166.1999 76.7777 1 336
                                    (log of days) 4.4949 1.0464 0 5.8406 4.9764 0.5664 0 5.817111
age (years old) 36.49833 11.21567 16 65 34.6749 10.7338 16 64
       (log of years old) 3.5514 0.3017 2.7726 4.1744 3.5017 0.2932 2.7726 4.1589
a dummy variable of male respondent 0.5085 0.4999 0 1 0.4562 0.4981 0 1
a dummy variable of married respondent 0.4160 0.4929 0 1 0.3536 0.4781 0 1
education years (years) 13.00106 1.959289 9 18 13.0448 1.8818 9 18
                          (log of years) 2.5537 0.1511 2.1972 2.8904 2.5581 0.1436 2.197225 2.890372
Panel B. The sample of late appliers (for Table 3)
27
job tenures before unemployment (days) 1586.826 2067.493 1 16132 1503.6760 1703.3840 7 15152
(log of days) 6.6014 1.3872 0 9.6886 6.8471 0.9668 1.9459 9.6259
a dummy variable of stopping a job involuntarily
before unemployment 0.1103 0.3133 0 1 0.0258 0.1584 0 1
monthly wage in a job after unemployment
(thousands of yen) 200.527 101.4319 1 8210 184.9648 66.3315 1 1400
(log of thousands of yen) 5.2245 0.3896 0 9.0131 5.1593 0.3629 0 7.244227
monthly wage difference before and after
unemployment (thousands of yen) 5.5419 114.1484 ‐8015 8020 ‐0.5295 78.2763 ‐3050 1260
effective job rates when started a job after




log of unemployment duration ‐0.0687*** ‐0.0597*** ‐0.0902***
(0.0067) (0.0079) (0.0126)
age (years of old) ‐0.194*** ‐0.3749*** 0.8572***
(0.0272) (0.0436) (0.1596)
a dummy variable of male respondent 0.0083 ‐0.0302 0.0939***
(0.0162) (0.0186) (0.0342)
a dummy variable of married respondent 0.1199*** 0.1152*** 0.1832***
(0.0165) (0.0195) (0.0308)
education years 0.4674*** 0.7382*** 0.0754
      (log of years) (0.0503) (0.0626) (0.0866)
pre‐unemployment job tenures 0.1250*** 0.1211*** 0.1251***
      (log of days) (0.0053) (0.0065) (0.0093)
post‐unemployment wage                    0.0705*** 0.1163*** 0.0408
       (log of thousands of yen)  (0.0227) (0.0293) (0.0379)
wage difference before and after unemployment ‐0.0001 ‐0.0001 ‐0.00005
       (thousands of yen) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00009)
a dummy variable of stopping pre‐unemployment ‐0.0686*** ‐0.0771*** ‐0.0998**
        job involuntarily (0.0228) (0.0266) (0.0450)
effective job rates when started 0.2368*** 0.2456*** 0.2242***
       post‐unemployment job (log of percentage) (0.0248) (0.0315) (0.0400)
constant 4.6841*** 4.3674*** 1.6755***





Number of the observations 76565 56984 19581
Log likelihood ‐62483.12 ‐46507.788 ‐15892.774
Likelihood ratio test: all the parameters are zero. 957.71*** 695.56*** 427.13***
Table 3. The effect of unemployment duration on retention rates at post‐unemployment job
             :for the samples who started applying for jobs in the final 59 days before expiration 
(a) Age 16‐44 (b) Age 45‐64
log of unemployment duration ‐0.4190*** ‐0.2537***
(0.0276) (0.0495)
age (years of old) ‐0.5451*** 0.972***
(0.0817) (0.3330)
a dummy variable of male respondent ‐0.0588* 0.0883
(0.0337) (0.0709)
a dummy variable of married respondent 0.0652* 0.1088*
(0.0364) (0.0615)
education years 0.7796*** 0.1731
      (log of years) (0.1168) (0.1856)
pre‐unemployment job tenures 0.0950*** 0.0642**
      (log of days) (0.0173) (0.0270)
post‐unemployment wage                    ‐0.1321** ‐0.1114
       (log of thousands of yen)  (0.0570) (0.0876)
wage difference before and after unemployment ‐0.0002 ‐0.0009**
       (thousands of yen) (0.0002) (0.0004)
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a dummy variable of stopping pre‐unemployment 0.0060 ‐0.0681
        job involuntarily (0.0480) (0.0934)
effective job rates when started ‐0.0344 ‐0.2879
       post‐unemployment job (log of percentage) (0.0975) (0.1899)
constant 7.9824*** 2.7881*
(0.4784) (1.5537)
Number of the observations 17823 4381
Log likelihood ‐13815.352 ‐3583.570
Likelihood ratio test: all the parameters are zero. 343.61*** 69.98***
